ACTIONS BY TRUSTEES IN BANKRUPTCY.
Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Bardes v. Bank, 2 N. B. N. Rep. 725, (i9oo), that
District Courts have no jurisdiction in actions by trustees
"except by the consent of the proposed defendant," the
weight of authority in the lower Federal Courts was in
favor of such jurisdiction. The Court of last resort in so
deciding did not overlook Ex parte Christy, 3 How. 292,
(1845) and the other cases holding that Congress could not
confer exclusive jurisdiction upon State Courts in such
actions, but nevertheless relegated the trustee to the State
Courts.
Clafin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, (1876), decides that
State Courts may exercise jurisdiction in such cases, but
neither that nor any other authority holds that they must.
"Not that Congress could confer jurisdiction upon the
State Courts but that these courts might exercise jurisdiction in cases authorized by the laws of the state, and not
prohibited by the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts."
It was doubtless pointed out in the argument of the
Bardes case that the denial of the jurisdiction of the District Court must necessarily render the Bankruptcy Act of
July I, 1898, not only less useful than the Acts of 1841
and 1867, but practically inoperative so far as its antipreferential features were concerned.
If the State Courts refuse to entertain suits to set aside
preferences, how can the Act be carriedinto effect?
In-Fry v. Trust Co., 195 Pa. 343, (19oo), the jurisdiction of the State Court was not questioned, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania merely affirming an order refusing to give to an assignee in bankruptcy a judgment for
want of a sufficient affidavit of defence.
It may be fancied that the point is merely of academic
interest, but the question has in fact already arisen. In
Lyon, trustee, v. Clark, 2 N. B. N. Rep. 792, (19oo) the
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Supreme Court of Michigan has ruled that the courts of
that state must not entertain jurisdiction of actions by trustees to reach property transferred contrary to the provisions
of the Bankruptcy Act, holding it "more consistent with the
dignity and independence of the state tribunals to decline to
take jurisdiction in cases arising under that act-if such
jurisdiction theoretically existed-rather than expose themselves to collisions and conflicts with the United States
Courts, or subject their proceedings to the control of those
courts in attempting to adjudicate them."
This was and is the settled law of Michigan: Voorhis v.
Frisbie, 25 Mich. 476, (1872); Sheldon v. Rounds, 40
Mich. 425, (I879); McMaster v. Cambell, 41 Mich. 513,
(1879), which it would seem that the Supreme Court of
the United States is powerless to change. Decisions elsewhere are to the same effect: Gilbert v. Priest, 65 Barb.
444; Brigham v. Claflin, 31 Wis. 607; Broinley v. Goodrich, 40 Wis. 131.
In Copp v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 43 La. Ann. 511,
(189i), state jurisdiction of a suit under the Interstate Commerce Act for unlawful discrimination is denied.
Battin v. Kear, 2 Phila. 3oi, (Sharswood,-J.), and Dudley
v. Mayhev, 3 N. Y. 9 (1849), (both decided before the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in patent cases was expressly
made exclusive) hold that as the rights of the patentee spring
wholly from the Federal Statutes, (Act of Congress, July 4,
I836,§ I7), the State Courts would not take jurisdiction.
Missouri River Telegraph Co. v. First NationalBank, 74
Ill. 217, (1874), denied jurisdiction of an action against a
national bank to recover penalties for exacting usury.
In Newell v. National Bank, 12 Bush 57, (1876), usury
was pleaded and an attempt made to set off the forfeiture
declared by the Act of Congress, but the State Court refused to enforce the penalty.
In an interesting and exhaustive note to Loughlin v. McCaulley, 48 L. R. A. 33, (186 Pa. 517, 1898), the general
subject of the "Administration of Federal laws in State
Courts" is ably discussed, and it is shown that the great
weight of authority is in favor of concurrent jurisdiction,
unless the State Courts are expressly excluded by Act of
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Congress. Among the Pennsylvania cases are: Bletz v.
Bank, 87 Pa. 87, (1878); Bank v. Gruber, 91 Pa. 377,
(1879); Bank v. Karmany, 98 Pa. 65, (1881).
But
no intimation can anywhere be found of a power reserved to
compel State Courts to take jurisdiction, much less to compel
them to take exclusive jurisdiction against their will. This
would seem to be clearly beyond the power of Congress. So
that it may be strongly urged that, as construed in Bardes v.
Bank, the Act of 1898 is either not "uniform," or it is an
unconstitutional infringement upon the rights of the states.
It would appear to flow from this that if the Bankruptcy
Law is to persist as a "uniform" system, an amendment
is called for, or the Bardes case must be reconsidered. In
this rather surprising situation, growing out of our dual
form of government, it may be of interest to notice some of
the constructions of the Act of 1898, which would lead to a
more happy issue.
Pursuant to the plenary powers granted to Congress by
the Constitution of the United States "to establish uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcy throughout the United
States" to which "power there is no limitation"-' and
which "may be exercised with the same latitude as the like
power has been or may be by the British Parliament :-2
the Act of July I, 1898, was passed, investing the District
Courts, inter alia, (§2) "with such jurisdiction at law
and in equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings to" . . . "(6) bring
in and substitute additional persons or parties in proceedings in bankruptcy when necessary for a complete determination of a matter in controversy:" "(7) cause the
estates of bankrupts to be collected and distributed, and determine controversies in relation thereto, except as herein
provided:" . . .
"( 18) tax costs, whenever they are
allowed by law, and render judgment therefor against the
unsuccessful party or the successful party for cause, or in
part against each of the parties, and against estates in proceedings in bankruptcy;

.

.

.

Nothing in this sec-

tion contained shall be construed to deprive a Court of
'In re Irvine, i Pa. L. J. 291, (Baldwin, J.).
'Kuntzler v. Kohaus, 5 Hill 317, (Cowen, J.).
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Bankruptcy of any power it would possess were certain
specific powers not therein enumerated," this broad and extensive delegation of power being qualified only by § 25 b.,
which provides that "Suits by the trustee shall only be
brought or prosecuted in the courts where the bankrupt
might have brought or prosecuted them if proceedings in
bankruptcy had not been instituted, unless by consent of the
proposed defendant."
At least three interpretations favorable to Federal jurisdiction have been ably advanced by excellent authorities.
These may be briefly noticed:
I. THAT JURISDICTION WAS CONFERRED AND WAS NOT
TAKEN AWAY BY SECTION 23 b., BECAusE THAT SECTION
LIKE SECTIONS 23 a AND 23 C, REFER ONLY TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE Circuit COURTS.

This reasonable theory was first advanced by Judge
Adams,8 and has been followed in four cases. 4
Judge Adams said, (91 Fed., page 372): "A trustee
appointed under the Bankrupt Act although an officer created by an Act of Congress is not by reason of that fact
alone, as in the case of a receiver appointed to wind up the
affairs of a National Bank, entitled to resort to the Circuit
Courts of the United States for the enforcement of his rights
as such officer, but must stand in the shoes of the bankrupt himself with respect to instituting suits in the Circuit
Courts of the United States. In other words, Section 23,
when properly construed, seems to me to mean that so
much of the Act of March 3, 1887, and Atigust 13, 1888, as
confers jurisdiction upon the Circuit Courts of the United
States of a suit in favor of an officer holding title under
a law of the United States is inoperative with respect to
the officer known as a trustee under the Bankrupt Act.
Subdivision (a) is in the nature of a prohibition addressed to the United States Circuit Courts from exercising
jurisdiction in any case between the trustee and an adverse
'In re Sievers, 9i Fed. 366, (1899).
"In re Newbury, 97 Fed. 24, (Severens, J.). Trust Co. z. Marx, 98
Fed. (456), (Evans, J.). In re Murphy, 2 N. B. N. R. 393. Cox v.
Wall, 2 N. B. N. FL 572, (Ewart, J.).
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claimant, unless the bankrupt himself could have resorted
to the Circuit Court for the assertion of such claim against
the adverse claimant. Subdivision (b) reinforces the prohibition of subdivision (a), but in this instance the prohibition is addressed to the trustee instead of the Circuit
Court as found in subdivision (a). Both subdivisions
when read together in my opinion, relate to the same subject
matter, and that is to the jurisdiction of the United States
Circuit Courts and to that alone. They limit the jurisdictions of such courts to hear and determine such actions
only between a trustee and an adverse claimant, as a bankrupt himself might have prosecuted against such claimants
in those courts because of diverse citizenship, and require
a trustee when asserting a claim through the right of title
of a bankrupt to resort to a State Court unless the bankrupt
might have resorted to a Federal Court. This section,
taken as a whole, appears to me to be only a curtailment
of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court and not at all applicable to District Courts or their jurisdiction as already
in the act conferred upon them. This is more manifest
when it is considered that District Courts, as such, are not
mentioned in the section, while the Circuit Courts are in
terms alone referred to in subdivisions (a) and (c). Subdivision (b) is found located immediately between subdivisions (a) and (c) and in the same act conferring a broad
and comprehensive jurisdiction upon the District Courts as

Court of Bankruptcy. Now applying two familiar rules
of construction of statutes; one of which is condensed in the
maxim "noscitur a sociis' and the other requiring the
Courts to so construe any act as to give force and effect to
each and all of its parts, I am disposed to hold that subdivision (b) relates to the same subject matter as that found in
the immediately preceding 'and following subdivisions
namely, to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the
United States and particularly to the matter of providing a
remedy which is there taken from such courts, and that
this subdivision finds full scope for application in such
places in which the District Court in full charge of the
given cause, because of the fact that the debtor or adverse
claimant resides without the territorial limits of the juris-
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diction, cannot afford a remedy, and in which the Circuit
Courts might have had jurisdiction except for the provisions of Section 23. In such cases the State Courts have
exclusive jurisdiction unless there is such diversity of citizenship as permits recourse to the Circuit Courts. It may
be that a trustee by virtue of subdivision (b) under consideration may at his election resort to any State Court
as a court of competent jurisdiction in any case for a remedy, but as to this I am not called upon to express an
opinion. I am, however, clearly of the opinion that subdivision (b) does not exclude a resort to this Court in any
proceeding by the trustee arising within its territorial jurisdiction."
2. THAT JURISDICTION WAS CONFERRED AND
TAKEN AWAY
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To Judge Brown of the Southern District of New York5
belongs the honor of first having announced the distinction between ordinary rights of action formerly belonging to
the bankrupt, and those rights of action which are peculiarly
the creatures of the act. This may be said to be the most
popular construction enunciated prior to the Bardes case. 6
It is well stated by Judge Baker in Carter v. Hobbs :T
"It seems to me to be clear that where the trustee brings
a suit to enforce a right of action which never existed in the
bankrupt, the District Court has ample jurisdiction to maintain it. The trustee's right of action in such a case is not
a derivative one, growing out of a prior right possessed by
the bankrupt, but his right is original, created by law, and
in the enforcement of it he represents the creditors, and his
'In re Gutwillig, go.Fed. 481.

'In re Brooks, 9i Fed. 509, (Wheeler, J.). Carter n,.
Hobbs. 92 Fed.
595, (Baker, J.). In re Crystal Spring Co., 96 Fed. 945. Murray v.

Beal, 97 Fed. 569, (Marshall, J.). Lowell on Binkruptcy, 412. In re
MhJrphy, 2 N. B. News 393. Pepperdine v. Headley, 98 Fed. 863,
(Phillips, J.).

Esq., Referee).
'92 Fed. 595.

In re Connolly. 2 N. B. N. R. 557, (E. F. Hoffman,
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suit is in effect the exact equivalent of a creditor's bill to
reach property fraudulently transferred."
3. THAT JURISDICTION WAS CONFERRED, AND THAT
SECTION 23, RELATING MERELY TO VENDUE, PREVENTED
SUIT IN ANY DISTRICT OF WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS
NOT AN INHABITANT "UNLESS BY CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED DEFENDANT."

Perhaps the ablest plea in favor of jurisdiction was by
Judge Amidon of North Dakota," whose opinion is well
worthy of careful perusal. Judge Baker, by independent
processes, afterwards reaches the same conclusion.9
Jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be conferred by
"consent" though jurisdiction of the parties may, 10 and
hence it is strongly urged that the only effect of Section 23
(b) is to prevent any suit except in the circuit of which the

defendant is an inhabitant, unless by his "consent""
Judge Amidon, after summing up the difficulties in the
case, 12 concludes: "We will now endeavor to find a construction of the Bankruptcy Act which will harmonize its
different provisions. The solution of the whole difficulty
is indicated by the last phrase of subdivision 'b' of Section
23.--'unless by consent of the proposed defendant.' Those
courts which have denied jurisdiction have entirely passed
over this clause.

It certainly renders impossible their con-

struction of the balance of the subdivision. If the limitation which the statute imposes may be set aside by consent of
the defendant, then it must relate to a matter wholly subject
to hisdiscretion. But accordingto the interpretation of those
courts that deny jurisdiction, it relates to the jurisdiction
of the subject matter.

It is elementary, however, that juris-

'In re Woodbury, 98 Fed. 833.
'Shutts v. Bank, 2 N. B. N. &R. 32o.
"'As to the meaning of "consent :" see In re Connolly, 57 Leg. Int.
164, (Apl. 2o, i9oo, McPherson, D. J.), 9 Dist. Rep. 217.
'Shepard v. Graves, 14 How. 505. Wickliffe v. Owings, 17 How. 47.
Evans v. Gee, ii Pet. 8o. Hartzog v. Memory, i16 U. S. 588.
"In re Woodbury, 98 Fed. 833, (I9OO). (See also Hall v. Kincell,
2 N. B. N. R. 745, where the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit (Gilbert, Ross and Morrow, Circuit Judges) quotes with
approval from Judge Amidon's opinion.)
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diction of courts as respects the subject matter cannot be left
to the discretion of the parties. That jurisdiction must be
created and defined by law, and if it does not exist the
action of the Court is nullity, notwithstanding the most
solemn stipulation of the litigants. My conclusion, therefore, is that subdivision 'b' does not relate to jurisdiction
of courts, but to the venue of suits. Under the Federal
statutes in force at the time the bankrupt law was passed,
a defendant, with certain- exceptions not now important,
could not be sued in a district of which he was an inhabitant; and in case the district was divided into divisions he
could not be sued except in the division of which he was a
resident. The object of subdivision 'b' was to apply this
restriction specifically to suits brought by trustees under the
Bankruptcy Act but that act furnishes still more direct cause
for the limitation. Under Section 45 the trustee need not
be a resident or citizen of a district in which the proceeding
is pending; he need not maintain an office in the district.
It would frequently occur that a majority of the creditors,
especially in the case of insolvent merchants, would be residents of a district other than that of the bankrupt. Take
for example the states of Wisconsin, Iowa, Indiana and
Michigan. It might easily happen that a majority of the
creditors of a bankrupt in either of these states would consist of the wholesale dealers at Chicago; and such creditors
might naturally prefer to place a trustee from their own
community, with whom they are personally acquainted, in
control of the bankrupt's estate. If this should occur, it
would be possible for such a trustee to sue any debtor of the
estate from either of the states named, in the district of Illinois if he should be found there; for it is well established
that when one sues in a representative capacity, it is his own,
and not the residence or citizenship of the person represented that fixes the venue and jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: Coal Co. v. Blatchford, Ii Wall 172, 20 L. Ed.
I70. It was this possible hardship that Congress had in
mind when it adopted the language contained in subdivision
'b,' But these statutes forbidding the 'suing of a defendant in a district of which he is not an inhabitant, or a division of which he is not a resident, creates only a personal
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privilege, which the defendants may waive, and which he
does waive unless he makes timely objection. Improvement Co. v. Gibney, i6o U. S. 217, i6 Sup. Court 272, 4o
L. Ed. 4o. It was to give force to this rule that the last
phrase of subdivision 'b' was employed-'unless by consent of the proposed defendant.' In the light of these considerations the words in subdivision 'b' 'in the courts
where' should be given their obvious sense as relating
to venue, and not be construed as meaning 'in the courts
which would possess jurisdiction.'

Giving to subdivision

'b' this construction brings all the provisions of the bankruptcy act on the subject into harmony, and also harmonizes
the Act of 1898 with previous statutes of the same character as they have been interpreted by the highest Federal
Courts."
Some of the general considerations in favor of jurisdiction may be thus summarized:
i. Jurisdiction undoubtedly existed under the Acts of
I84I'l and 186914 notwithstanding less explicit grants
thereof.
2. Congress has not the constitutional power to give
State Courts exclusive jurisdiction :1-5
3. The power of a Court of Equity, having once taken
jurisdiction of a rem, to fully adjudicate all questions relating thereto as in the analogous case of receiverships :1j
4. The express power to appoint receivers for the preservation of estates (§2) in whom is vested, by operation
of law the title to the property transferred in fraud of
creditors, (§70).
"Ex parle Christy, 3 Howard
Cases 662.

312.

Mitchell v. Manfg. Co., Fed.

"Sherman v. Bingham, Fed. Cases 12762. Goodall v. Tuttle, Fed.
Cases 5533, (1872). Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U. S. 516, (1875).
"Martin v. Hunter, 14 U. S. 304, 33o. Houston v. Moore, i8 U. S.
65 U. S. 275, (i896). McLean v.
1, 27. Robertson v. Baldwin,
Bank, Fed. Cases 8885, (McLean, J.). Sterns v. U. S. Fed. Cases
13341. I Kent. Comm. 399, 400. 2 Story Const., (3rd Ed.), §§ 17521755.
"Murray v. Beal, 97 Fed. 568, (i899). Porter v. Sabin, 149 U. S.
473. White v. Ewing, 159 U. S.36.
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5. These canons of construction are involved:

(a) An exception must be strictly construed.
(b) A remedial statute is to be liberally expounded.
(c) Apparently conflicting clauses must, if possible, be
so interpreted as to give effect to both.
(d) The absurdity of first granting plenary jurisdiction
and then withdrawing it in the same act.
(e) Section 23 "a" would be entirely nugatory because
Section 23 "b" applies to all courts.
6. "Congress did not intend to trust the working of
the bankrupt system solely to the State Courts of twentysix states."' 7
Judge Lowell has contributed an exhaustive opinion to
the literature of the subject,' where the cases are collected.
Ira Jewell Williams.
August, 19oo.

T
"ER parte Christy, 3 How. 312.
'In re Hammond, 98 Fed. 845.

